A network is a graph where the nodes represent agents and an arc exists between two nodes if the corresponding agents interact bilaterally. An exogeneous value function gives the value of each network, while an allocation rule describes how the value of any graph is distributed amongst the agents. We explore the possibility of constructing allocation rules which will ensure that efficient networks of agents will form when the individual agents decide to form or severe links amongst themselves.
Introduction
The interaction between agents can often be fruitfully described by a network structure or graph, where the nodes represent the agents and an arc exists between two nodes if the corresponding agents interact bilaterally. Network structures have been used in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from social networks (Wellman and Berkowitz (1988) ), information transmission (Goyal (1993) ), internal organization of firms (Marschak and Reichelstein (1993J ), to the structure of airline routes (Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1995) ) 1 .
In a recent paper, Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) focus on the stability of networks. Their analysis is designed to give predictions concerning which networks are likely to form when self-interested agents can choose to form new links or severe existing links. They use a specification where a value function gives the value (or total product) of each graph or network, while an allocation rule gives the distribution of value amongst the agents forming the network. A principal result of their analysis shows that efficient graphs (that is, graphs of maximum value) may not be stable when the allocation rule treats individuals symmetrically.
The main purpose of this paper is to subject the potential conflict between stability and efficiency of graphs to further scrutiny. In order to do this, we follow Dutta, et. al. (1995) and assume that agents' decisions on whether or not to form a link with other agents can be represented as a game in strategic form 2 . In this "link formation" game, each player announces a set of players with whom he or she wants to form a link. A link between two players is formed if both players want the link. This rule determines *We are most grateful to Matthew Jackson for several helpful discussions and suggestions. Thanks are also due to Sudipto Bhattacharya for comments on an earlier version of the paper. This version of the paper was written when the first author was visiting Caltech. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
1See van den Nouweland (1993) and Sharkey (1995) for detailed surveys and additional references. 2This game was originally suggested by Myerson (1991) , and subsequently used by Qin (1993) . See also Hart and Kurz (1983) who discuss a similar strategic form game in the context of the endogenous formation of coalition structures.
the graph corresponding to any n-tuple of announcements. The value function and the allocation rule then give the payoff function of the strategic form game.
Since the link formation game is a well-defined strategic form game, one can use any equilibrium concept to analyze the formation of networks. In this paper we will define a graph to be strongly stable (respectively weakly stable) if it corresponds to a strong Nash equilibrium (respectively coalition proof Nash equilibrium) of the link formation game. Although Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) did not use the link formation game, their specification assumed that only two-person coalitions can form; their notion of pairwise stability is implied by our concept of strong stability. Hence, it follows straightaway from their analysis that there is a conflict between strong stability and efficiency if the allocation rule is symmetric.
How can we ensure that efficient graphs will form? One possibility is to use allocation rules which are not symmetric. For instance, fix a vector of weights w = ( w 1 , w 2 , •.
• , wn)· Call an allocation rule w-fair if the gains or losses to players i and j from the formation of the new link (ij) is proportional to � · w-fair rules are symmetric only if Wi = Wj J for all i and j. However, the vector of weights w can be chosen so that there is only a 'slight' departure from symmetry. We first show that the class of w-fair rules coincides with the class of weighted Shapley values of an appropriately defined transferable-utility game. We then go on to construct a value function under which no efficient graph is strongly stable for any w-fair allocation rule. Thus, the relaxation of symmetry in this direction does not help.
A second possibility is to use weak stability instead of strong stability. However, again we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency, symmetry and (weak) stability.
We then go on to adopt an implementation or mechanism design approach. Suppose the implicit assumption or prediction is that only those graphs which correspond to strong Nash equilibria of the link formation game will form. Then our interest in the ethical properties of the allocation rule should be restricted only to how the rule behaves on the class of these graphs. Hence, if we want symmetry of the allocation rule, we should be satisfied if the allocation rule is symmetric on the subdomain of strongly stable graphs.
We analyze two specific problems within this general approach. In the first design problem we construct an allocation rule which ensures that; (i) the class of strongly stable graphs is a nonempty subset of the set of efficient graphs, and (ii) satisfies the restriction that the rule is symmetric on the class of strongly stable graphs. This result is proved under a very mild restriction on the class of value functions. The second result is much stronger, but is proved for a more restrictive class of value functions. More specifically, we construct an allocation rule which (given the restrictions on the class of value functions) ensures that; (i) there is at least one strongly stable graph, (ii) all weakly stable graphs are efficient, and (iii) the allocation rule is symmetric on the class of weakly stable graphs. Thus, this achieves a kind of 'double' implementation in Strong Nash and Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
A common feature of the allocation rules constructed by us is that these distribute the value of stable graphs equally amongst all agents. Obviously, this ensures symmetry of the allocation rules on the class of stable graphs. Of course, the rules do not treat agents symmetrically on some graphs which are not stable. Indeed, the nonsymmetries are carefully constructed so as to ensure that the other requirements of the design problem(s) are satisfied.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide definitions of some key concepts. Section 3 describes the link formation game, while section 4 contains the results. We conclude in section 5.
Some Definitions
Let N = {1, 2, ... , n} be a finite set of agents with n � 3. Interactions between agents are represented by graphs whose vertices represent the players, and whose arcs depict the pairwise relations. The complete graph, denoted gN, is the set of all subsets of N of size 2. G is the set of all possible graphs on N, so that G ={gig C gN}.
Given any g E G, let N(g) = {i E Nl::Jj such that (ij) E g}.
The link ( ij) is the subset of N containing i, j. g + ( ij) and g --( ij) are the graphs obtained from g by adding and subtracting the link ( ij) respectively. i and j are connected in g if there is a sequence { i0, i1, . .. , i K} such that i0 = i, i K = j and (ikik+i) E g for all k = 0, 1, ... , K-1. We will use C(g) to denote the set of connected components of g. 3 g is said to be fully connected (respectively connected on S) if all pairs of agents in N (respectively in S) are connected. g is totally disconnected if g = {0}. If his a component of g, then N(h) = {il(ij) Eh for some j E N\{i}}, and nh denotes the cardinality of N(h).
The value of a graph is represented by a function v : G -t R. We will only be interested in the set V of such functions satisfying Component Additivity.
We interpret the value function to indicate the total "output" produced by agents in N when they are "organized" according to a particular graph. For instance, the members of N may be workers in a firm. The graph g then represents the internal organization of the firm, that is the structure of communication amongst the workers. Alternatively, N could be a set of (tax) auditors and supervisors, and g could represent a particular 3We use the (harmless) convention that an isolated player, that is, a player who is not connected to any other player in g is not considered to be a component. 4 In common with Jackson and Wolinsky, we are implicitly assuming that the value of a disconnected player is zero. This assumption can be dropped at the cost of some complicated notation.
hierarchical structure of auditors and supervisors. In this case v(g) is the (expected) tax revenue realized from a population of tax payers when g is in "operation."
It is worth emphasizing at this point that the value function is a very general concept. In particular, it is more general than Myerson's (1977) games with cooperation structure. A cooperation structure is a graph in our terminology. Given any exogenously specified transferable utility game (N, u) and a graph g, we define for each Sc N, the restricted graph on Sas glS-{(ij) E gli,j ES}. The graph-restricted game (N, uY) specifies the worth of a coalition as follows.
As (2.1) makes clear, the value or worth of a given set of agents in Myerson's formu lation depends on whether they are connected or not, whereas in the Jackson-Wolinsky approach, the value of a coalition can in principle depend on how they are connected.
Given v, g is strongly efficient if v(g) 2: v(g') for all g' E G. Let E(v) denote the set of strongly efficient graphs.
Finally, an allocation rule Y : G x V -+ R N describes how the value associated with each network is distributed to the individual players. Yi(g, v) will denote the payoff to player i from graph g under the value function v. Clearly, any allocation rule corresponds to the concept of a solution in cooperative game theory.
Given a permutation 7r
The following condition imposes the restriction that all agents should be treated symmetrically by the allocation rule. In particular, names of the agents should not determine their allocation. 
Component balance implies that cross-subsidization is ruled out. We will restrict attention to component balanced allocation rules throughout the paper 5 .
The Link Formation Game
In this section, we describe the strategic form game which will be used to model the endogenous formation of networks or graphs6. The following description of the link formation game assumes a specific value function v and an allocation rule Y. Let 
The linking game r('Y) is given by the (n + 2) -tuple (N; S 1 , ... , Sn, j"t), where for each i E N, Si is player i's strategy set with Si = 2 N l{ i } and the payoff function is the mapping f'Y :
for all s E S, with
So a typical strategy of player i in r( ry ) consists of the set of players with whom i wants to form a link. Then, (3.2) states that a link between i and j forms if and only if they both want to form this link. Hence, each strategy vector gives rise to a unique graph g(s). Finally, the payoff to player i associated with si s simply Yi(v, g(s)), the payoff that is given by the allocation rule for the graph induced by s7.
We now define some equilibrium concepts for r ( 'Y ) . Definition 3.1 : A strategy vector s* E Sis a Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) of r(!') if there is no T � N and 's E S such that
The second equilibrium concept that will be used in this paper is that of coalition proof Nash Equilibrium ( CPNE). In order to define the concept of CPNE of r( 'Y ) , we need some more notation. For any T C N, and s� IT E S NI T -IliE N IT Si, let r( "(, s�1 T ) denote the game induced on T by s� I T ' So, (3.3) where for all j ET, for all STE ST , f](sT) = f] (sT, s� IT ). The set of CPNE of r(!') is defined inductively on the set of players.
Definition 3.2 :
In a single-player game, s* is a CPNE of r(!') iff si maximizes f?(s) over S. Let r(1) be a game with n players, where n > 1. Suppose CPNE have been defined for all games with less than n players. Then, (i) s* E S is self-enforcing if for all T c N, sr is a CPNE of r(!', s� 1T ); and (ii) s* E S is a CPNE of r(!') if it is self-enforcing and moreover there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy vector
Our interest lies not in the strategy vectors which are SNE or CPNE of r(!'), but in the graphs which are induced by these equilibria. This motivates the following definition. Hence, a strongly stable graph is induced or supported by a strategy vector which is a strong Nash equilibrium of the linking game. Of course, a strongly stable graph must also be weakly stable.
Finally, in order to compare the Jackson-Wolinsky notion of pairwise stability, sup pose the following constraints are imposed on the set of possible deviations in Definition 3.1. First, the deviating coalition can contain at most two agents. Second, the deviation can consist of severing just one existing link or forming one additional link. Then, the set of graphs which are immune to such deviations is called pairwise stable. Obviously, if g* is strongly stable, then it must be pairwise stable.
The Results
Notice that strong stability (as well as weak stability) has been defined for a specific value function v and allocation rule Y. Of course, which network structure is likely to form must depend upon both the value function as well as on the allocation rule. Here, we adopt the approach that the value function is given exogenously, while the allocation rule itself can be "chosen" or "designed".
Within this general approach, it is natural to seek to construct allocation rules which are (ethically) attractive and which also lead to the formation of stable network structures which maximize output, no matter what the exogenously specified value function. This is presumably the underlying motive behind Jackson and Wolinsky's search for a symmetric allocation rule under which at least one strongly efficient graph would be pairwise stable.
Given their negative result, we initially impose weaker requirements. First, instead of full anonymity, we only ask that the allocation rule be w-fair, a condition which is defined presently. However, we show that there can be value functions under which no strongly efficient graph is strongly stable8. Second, we retain (full anonymity), but replace strong stability by weak stability. Again, we construct a value function under which the (unique) strongly efficient graph is not weakly stable.
Our final results, which are the main results of the paper, explicitly adopt an imple mentation approach to the problem. Assuming that strong Nash equilibrium is the "ap propriate" concept of equilibrium and that the individual agents decide to form network relations through the link formation game is equivalent to predicting that only strongly stable graphs will form. Let S( ry ) be the set of strongly stable graphs corresponding to ry ( v, Y) . Instead of imposing full anonymity, we only require that the allocation rule be anonymous on the restricted domain S("!). However, we now require that for all per missible value functions, S(ry) is contained in the set of strongly efficient graphs, instead of merely intersecting with it, which was the "target" sought to be achieved in the earlier results. We are able to construct an allocation rule which satisfies these requirements.
Suppose, however, that the designer has some doubt whether strong Nash equilibrium is really the "appropriate" notion of equilibrium. In particular, she apprehends that weakly stable graphs may also form. Then, she would want to ensure anonymity of the allocation rule over the larger class of weakly stable graphs, as well as efficiency of these graphs. Assuming a stronger restriction on the class of permissible value functions, we are able to construct an allocation rule which satisfies these requirements. In addition, the allocation rule also guarantees that the set of strongly stable graphs is nonempty.
Our first result uses w-fairness. Fix a vector w = (w 1 , ... , wn) · Definition 4.1 : An allocation rule Y is w-fair, if for all v E V, for all g E G, for all
In Proposition 4.1 below, we show that the unique allocation rule which satisfies w-fairness and component balance is the Weighted Shapley value of the following char acteristic function game.
Take any ( v, g) E V x G. Recall that for any S � N, the restricted graph on S is denoted glS. Then, the TU game U v , g is given by: (1995) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) . The former proved that w-fair allocation 8 We point out below that strong stability can be replaced by pairwise stability.
rules satisfying component balance are the weighted Shapley values (also called weighted
Myerson values) of the graph-restricted game given by any exogeneous TU game and any graph g. Of course, the set of graph-restricted games is a strict subset of V, and hence Proposition 4.2 is a formal generalization of their result. Jackson and Wolinsky show that where wi = W j for all i, j, then the unique w-fair allocation rule satisfying component balance is the Shapley value of uv , g · Our first result on stability follows. The motivation for proving this result is the following. Since the weight vector w can be chosen to make the allocation rule 'approx imately' anonymous (by choosing w to be very close to the unit vector (1, ... , 1), we may 'almost' resolve the tension between stability, efficiency and symmetry unearthed by Jackson-Wolinsky by using such a w-fair allocation rule. However, the next result rules out this possibility. Our next result uses weak stability instead of strong stability. Hence, { i, k} can deviate from gj and form the additional link ( ik). This will pre cipitate the complete graph. From preceding arguments, the deviation is profitable if 1 E < 12'
Letting sN denote the strategy n-tuple which induces gN, one notes that sN is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, the deviation of { i, k} to sN is not deterred by the possibility of a further deviation by either i or k. So, gj is not weakly stable. This completes the proof of the theorem.
I
Remark 4. 7 : Again note that only a 2-person coalition has to form to block gj. So, the result could have been proved in terms of "pairwise weak stability", which is strictly weaker than pairwise stability. Hence, this generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's basic result. 
Thus, a monotonic value function has the property that additional links never decrease the value of the graph 9• A special class of monotonic value functions, the class considered 9Hence, gN is strongly efficient.
by Dutta, et. al. (1995) , is the set of graph-restricted games derived from super-additive TU games. Of course, there are also other contexts which might give rise to monotonic value functions. Dutta, et. al. proved that for the class of graph-restricted games derived from super-additive TU games, a large class of component balanced allocation rules (including all w-fair rules with w » 0) has the property that the set of weakly stable graphs is a subset of the set of graphs which are payoff-equivalent to gN. Moreover, gN itself is weakly stable 1 0. Their proof can be easily extended to cover all monotonic value functions. We state the following result. Note that Theorem 4.9 ensures that only strongly-efficient graphs are weakly stable. Thus, if our prediction is that only weakly-stable graphs will form, then this result guarantees that there will be no loss in efficiency. This guarantee is obviously stronger than that provided if some stable graph is strongly efficient. In the latter case, there is the possibility that other stable graphs are inefficient, and since there is no reason to predict that only the efficient stable graph will form, inefficiency can still occur.
Unfortunately, monotonicity of the value function is a stringent requirement. There are a variety of problems in which the optimum network is a tree or a ring. For example, cost allocation problems give rise to the minimum-cost spanning tree 1 2 . Efficient airline routing or optimal trading arrangements may also imply that the star or ring is the efficient network. 1 3 Indeed, in cases where there is a (physical) cost involved in setting up an additional link, gN will seldom be the optimal network. This provides the motivation to follow the "implementation approach" and prove results similar to that of Theorem 4.9, but covering nonmonotonic value functions. First, we construct a component balanced allocation rule which is anonymous on the set of strongly stable graphs and which ensures that all strongly stable graphs are strongly efficient.
In order to prove this result, we impose a restriction on the class of value functions. Before we formally define the particular allocation rule which will be used in the proof of the next theorem, we discuss briefly the key properties which will have to be satisfied by the rule.
Choose some efficient g* E G. Supposes* induces g*, and we want to ensure that g* is strongly stable. Now, consider any g which is different from g*, and lets induce g. Then, the allocation rule must punish at least o;ne a;gent .yvho has . deviated from s* to s. This ''
•'
is possible only if a deviant can be identified. This is trivial if there is some ( ij) E g lg*, because then both i and j must concur in forming the extra link (ij). However, if g Cg*, say (ij) E g*lg, then either i or j can unilaterally break the link. The only way to ensure that the deviant is punished is to punish both i and j.
Several simple punishment schemes can be devised to ensure that at least two agents who have deviated from s* are punished sufficiently to make the deviation unprofitable.
However, since the allocation rule has to be component balanced, these punishment schemes may result in some other agent being given more than the agent gets in g*. This possibility creates a complication because the punishment scheme has to satisfy an additional property. Since we also want to ensure that inefficient graphs are not strongly stable, agents have to be provided with an incentive to deviate from any graph which is not strongly efficient. Hence, the punishment scheme has to be relatively more sophisticated.
Choose some strongly efficient g* with C (g*) = {hi, ... , hj}, and let >-be a strict ordering on arcs of g*. Consider any other graph g, and let C(g) = {h1, ... , hK}·
The first step in the construction of the allocation rule is to choose agents who will be punished in some components hk E C(g). For reasons which will become clear later on, we only need to worry about components hk such that D(hk) = { i E N(hk)l(ij) E g* for somej (j. N(hk)} is nonempty. For such components, choose i(hk) -iksuch thatN j E N(hk)\ { ik}, Nk (j. N(hk):
We will say that g is a *-supergraph of g* if for each h* E C(g*), there is h E C(g) such that N(h*) � N(h). Note that the fully connected graph is a *-supergraph of every graph. Lemma 4.12 : Suppose g = (h1, ... , hK) is not a *-supergraphof g*. Then, ::lk, l E {1, ... , K} such that (ikiz) E g*.
Proof: : Since g is not a *-supergraph, it follows that g is not fully connected, and that there exists a component h and players i,j such that i E N(h),j tJ. N(h) and (ij) E g*. Indeed, assume that for each hk E C(g), the set D(hk) is nonempty. 1 4 For every k = 1, 2, ... , K, there is jk tJ. N(hk) such that (ikjk) E g* and (idk) >-(ij) for all i E D(hk)\{ik} and for all j tJ. N(hk) with (ij) E g*. Let the >--maximal element within the set { (i1,j1) , ... , (idk)} be (ik*jk*). Let jk* E N(hz). Note that from the definition of the pair ( ik* jk*), it follows that l i= k*. Also, ( ik* jk*) E g*. It therefore follows that iz = jk* and j1 = ik*· Hence, (ik*iz) E g*. This completes the proof of the lemma.
The implication of Lemma 4.12 is the following. Suppose one or more agents de viate from g* to some g E G with components·'{hr, .. ·;, hK}; Then, the set of agents {i(h1), ... , i(hK)} must contain a deviator. This property will be used intensively in the proof of the next theorem. Proof: : Choose any v EV*. Fix g* E E(v). Let C(g*) ={hi, ... , hK}· An allocation rule Y* satisfying the required properties will be constructed which ensures that g* is strongly stable. Moreover, no g will be strongly stable unless it is in E( v ).
For any S � N with ISi ;::: 2, let Gs be the set of graphs which are connected on S, and have no arcs outside S. So, Gs= {g E Gig is connected on S, and N(g) = S}.
e as = min gEGs ISl(ISl--1). so, e Vm = min gEGN n(n--2) .
Choose any E such that
The allocation rule Y* is defined by the following rules. Choose any g.
Clearly, the rule defined above is component balanced. We will show later that Y* is anonymous on the set of strongly stable graphs. We first show that the efficient graph g* is strongly stable under the above allocation rule.
Lets* be the strategy profile defined as follows: For all i EN, si = {j E Nl(ij) E g*}. Clearly, s* induces g* in "f = (v, Y*). We need to show thats* is a SNE of r("f).
Consider any s =I= s*, and let g be induced by s. Also, let T = {i E Nlsi =I= si}.
Yi*(v,g) = v�� ) for alli E N(h). However, since g* is efficient, there exists some i EI such that v( h i) > v( h ) . So no member of hi is better off as a result of the deviation. Also, note
that T n N(hi) =I= 0. So, T does not have a profitable deviation in this case.
Suppose there is h E C(g) such that N(h) =I= UiEIN(hi) for any nonempty subset I of {1, ... , K}. Then, g is not a *-supergraph of g*, and let G(g) = {hi, ... , hL}· From the above lemma, there exists ( ikiz) E g* where ik and iz are the players who are punished in hk and hz respectively. Obviously, rn{ik, i1} =/= ¢. But from Rule (2), it follows that Yi:(v, g) = (nhk -l)c and Yi;(v, g) = (nh1 -l)c. Given the value of E, it follows that both ik and ih are worse-off from the deviation.
We now show that if g is strongly stable, then g E E(v). So suppose that g is an inefficient graph.
(i) If g is an inefficient graph which is a *-supergraphof g*, then there exist h E C(g), h* E G(g*) such that N(h*) � N(h) and
So, each i E N(h*) can deviate to the strategy s;. This will induce the component h* where they are all strictly better off.
(ii) Suppose that g is not a *-supergraph of g*. Let G(g) = (h1, ... , hK)· Without loss of generality, let nh1 � ••• � nh K · Since g is not a *-supergraph of g*, Rule (2) of the allocation rule applies and we know that there exist hk, hz E C(g), and ihk E N(hk), ih1 E N(hz) such that Yi*h ( v, g)
Let g be the graph induced by s. Notice that g = g + (ihkih1) . We claim that (4.7)
Let h E C(g) be the component containing players ihk and ih z · Notice that nr,, > max( nhk, nhJ Given the value of E, it follows that This shows that the coalition { ihk, ih1} has a deviation which makes both players better off.
The second half of the proof also shows that g is strongly stable only if g is a * supergraph of g*. From Rule (1), it is clear that Y* is anonymous on all such graphs. This observation completes the proof of the theorem.
Ill
Our next theorem shows that if a stronger restriction is placed on the class of per missible value functions, an allocation rule can be constructed which ensures 'double implementation' in strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. (ii) There exists g* E E( v) such that g* is focussed.
We now assume that the class of permissible value functions is V. This is a much stronger restriction than the assumption used in the previous theorem. However, there are several interesting problems which give rise to such value functions. Indeed, the two special models discussed by Jackson and Wolinsky (the symmetric connections and coauthor models) both give rise to value functions in V.
Choose some v E V, and let g* E E(v) be focussed. Assume that (hi, ... , hk) are the components of g*, and let ik be the player who is connected to all other players in N(hk) .15 15If more than one such player exists, then any selection rule can be employed.
Let >-p be a strict order on the player set N satisfying the following conditions:
So, >-p satisfies two properties. First, all agents in N(hk) are ranked above agents in N(hk +l ). Second, within each component, the player who is connected to all other players is ranked first.
Finally, choose any E satisfying ( 4.6).
The allocation rule Y* is defined by the following rules. Choose any g and h E C(g).
Let Jh be the "minimal" element of N(h) under the order >-p· Then, for all i E N(h),
(Rule 3) Suppose N(h) g; N(h*) for any h* E C(g*). Let Jh be the "minimal" element of N(h) under the order >-p· Then, for all i E N(h),
The allocation rule has the following features. First, provided a component consists of the same set of players as some component in g*, the value of the component is divided equally amongst all the agents in the component. Second, punishments are levied in all other cases. The punishment is more severe if players form links across components in g*.
Let s* be the strategy profile given by si = {j E Nl(ij) E g*} for all i E N, and let C(g*) = {hi, ... , h'k }. We first show that if agents in components hi, ... , hk are using the strategies si , then no group of agents in hk will find it profitable to deviate. Moreover, this is independent of the strategies chosen by agents in components coming "after" hk. Consider any s', and let g' be the graph induced by s'. Suppose T = {i E N(hi)lsi # s a # 0.
Case (1): There exists h E C(g') such that N(h) = N(hi). In this case, Rule (1) applies, and we have Yt(v,g') = 1;��) I ::::; 1;��1{) 1 = Yt(v,g)Vi E N(hi). So no i E N(hi) benefits from the deviation.
Case (2): There exists h E C(g') such that N(h) n N(hi) # ¢, and N(h) g N(hi). In this case, Rule (3) applies, and we have
Noting that N(hi) n N(h) n T # 0, we must have f?(s) > f?(s') for some i ET.
Noting that there is ii who is connected to everyone in N(hi), either ii E T or T = N(h). If ii ET, then since J i � (s ') ::::; (nh -l)E <J i � (s ), the lemma is true. Suppose ii r/:. T. Ruling out the trivial case where a single agent breaks away, i 5 we have ITI 2: 2.
From Rule 2 or Rule 3, at least one of the agents must be worse off.
Hence, in all possible cases, there is some i E T who does not benefit from the deviation.
The proof can be extended in an obvious way for all values of K. Proof: : Ifs is not a Nash equilibrium of r( 'Y ) , then there is nothing to prove. So, assume that s constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
We will prove the lemma by showing that there is a credible deviation from s for a coalition D c N(hi), IDI = 2. The game induced on the coalition D is defined as r('r, SN\D) = (D, {Si} iED ' ft) where f](s�) = Yj*(v, g(s�, SN\D)) for all j ED. We show that there is a Nash equilibrium in this two-person game which Pareto-dominates the payoff corresponding to s.
16The agent then gets 0.
Suppose there is i E N(hi) \ N(h) , j t/:. N(hi) such that (ij) E g. Then, Yi*( v, g) = �· Since sis a Nash equilibrium, this implies that i by a unilateral deviation cannot induce a graph g' in which i will be in some component such that N(h') � N(hi) . Now, let j be the >-p-maximal agent in N(h). Consider the coalition D = {i,j}. Choose s � = {j}, and let sj be the best response to s � in the game I'(11, SN\D)· Then, (s � , s j ) must be a Nash equilibrium in I'(11, SN\D). 1 7 Using Rule (2), it is trivial to check that both i and j gain by deviating to s ' from s.
Hence, we can now assume that if
Wlog, let 1 be the >-p-maximal agent in N(hi) , and 1 E N(h1). Let i be the >-p maximal agent in N(h2) , and let D = {1, i}.
Suppose L > 2. Then, consider 81 = s1 U {i} , and let Bi be the best response to 81 in the game I'(!, SN\D)· Note that 1 can never be the residual claimant in any component, and that 1 E h It then follows that (81, Bi) is a Nash equilibrium in r('Y, SN\D) which Pareto-dominates the payoffs (of D) corresponding to the original strategy profile s.
Suppose L = 2. Let S = {sis= (81, si, s _D)for some(s 1 , si) E 81 xSi. Let G be the set of graphs which cari. be induced by D subject to the restriction that both 1 and i belong to a component which is connected on N(hi) . Let g be such that v(g) = max9 E 0v(g), and suppose that s induces g. Then, note that i E s 1 and
a Nash equilibrium in r('Y, SN\D), then this completes the proof of the Lemma. Suppose (s1, si) is not a Nash equilibrium of I'(')', sN\D)· Then, the only possibility is that i has a profitable deviation since 1 can never become the residual claimant. Let si be the best response to 81 in r('Y, SN\D)· Note that 1 E h Let g denote the induced graph. We must therefore have Yi* ( v, g) > Yi* ( v, g) . 1 9 Obviously, Yi* ( v, g) > Yi* ( v, g). Since 81 is also a best response to Si in r(!', SN\D), this completes the proof of the lemma.
We can now prove the following. (ii) If g is weakly stable, then g E E( v ).
(iii) Y is anonymous over the set of weakly stable graphs.
17The fact that i has no profitable deviation from s� follows from the assumption that the original strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
18 Again, we are ignoring the possible existence of isolated individuals.
19This follows since 1 is now in a component containing more agents.
Proof: : Clearly, the allocation rule Y defined above is component balanced. We first show that the efficient graph g* is strongly stable by showing that s* is a strong Nash equilibrium of r( "().
Let C(g*) = {hi , ... , hjd.
Let s I-s* , g be the graph induced by s, and T = {i E Nlsi I-si}. Let t* argmin 1:::; j :::; Ksi I-si for some i E N(h j ).
By Lemma 4.15, it follows that at least one member in N(ht* ) n T does not profit by deviating from the strategy s*. This shows that the graph g* is strongly stable.
We now show that if g is not efficient, then it cannot be weakly stable. Let s be a strategy profile which induces the graph g. We have the following cases.
Case {la): There exists h E C(g) such that N(hi) = N(h) and v (h) < v (hi) .
Suppose all individuals i in N(hi) deviate to s; . Clearly, all individuals in N(hi) gain from this deviation. Moreover, Lemma 4.15 shows that no sub-coalition of N(hi) has any further profitable deviation. Hence, s cannot be a CPNE of I'("!) in this case.
Case {ib): There does not exist h E C(g) such that N(h) � N(hi) .
In this case all players in N (hi) are either isolated (in which case they get zero) or they are in (possibly different) components which contain players not in N(hi). Using Rule (3) of the allocation rule, it follows that Yi( v , g) :S �Vi E N(h�).
So all players in N(hi) can deviate to the strategy s;. Obviously, this will make them strictly better off. That this is a credible deviation follows from Lemma 4.15.
Case {Jc):
There exists h E C(g) such that N(h) C N(hi) .
In this case, it follows from Lemma 4.17 that there is a credible deviation for a coalition D C N (hi) . These show that all weakly stable graphs must be efficient. Furthermore, it follows from Rule (1) that Y is anonymous on all such graphs. This completes the proof of the theorem.
I

Conclusion
The central theme in this paper has been to examine the possibility of constructing allo cation rules which will ensure that efficient networks of agents form when the individual agents decide to form or severe links amongst themselves. Exploiting the insights pro vided by Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) , it is shown that in general it may not be possible to reconcile efficiency with stability if the allocation rule is required to be anonymous on all graphs.
However, we go on to argue that if our prediction is that only efficient graphs will form, then the requirement that the allocation rule be anonymous on all graphs is unnecessarily stringent. We suggest that a "mechanism design" approach is more appropriate, and show that under almost all value functions, the nonempty set of (strongly) stable graphs will be a subset of the efficient graphs under an allocation rule which is anonymous on the domain of strongly stable graphs. A stronger domain restriction allows us to prove that the above result also holds when strong stability is replaced by weak stability. Since these allocation rules will treat agents symmetrically on the graphs which are "likely to be observed," it seems that stability can be reconciled with efficiency after all.
